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Abstract  
This paper reviews the literature regarding the consequences of interbank competition. The 
literature has identified three reasons why competition in the financial sector is important:  
firstly, for efficient functioning of financial intermediaries and markets, secondly, for firms 
and households access to financial services and thirdly, for stability of the financial system. 
While special attention is dedicated to empirical papers focusing on African banking systems, 
this review also considers works on other developing and developed economies. 
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1 Introduction
In response to state interventions in finance and to their potential negative consequences
on competition, some authors point out the importance of competition in the banking
sector in promoting efficiency and financial inclusion without necessarily undermining
financial stability (Beck et al., 2011; World Bank, 2013).
The conventional view suggests that market power is detrimental in banking as well as
in other industries. By lowering financial intermediation costs, increasing loan quantities,
and extending the ranges of financial services available, more competitive banking systems
enhance financial intermediation. However, due to particularities of the banking industry,
the impact of market power is more ambiguous in banking than in other sectors. Limited
competition can help to provide incentives to acquire information on borrowers or to
stabilize the financial system.
This paper reviews the literature regarding the consequences of interbank competi-
tion. The literature has identified three reasons why competition in the financial sector
is important: firstly, for efficient functioning of financial intermediaries and markets, sec-
ondly, for firms and households access to financial services and thirdly, for stability of the
financial system.1 Section 2 analyzes the literature regarding the relationship between
competition and efficiency. The consequences of competition on credit availability are
reviewed in Section 3 and Section 4 presents the competition - stability debate. Special
attention is dedicated to empirical papers that focus on African banking systems. Indeed,
the competition issue is reinforced in Africa by recent trends. The expansion of African
cross-border banking groups has brought on some transformations in African banking
industries that have had repercussions in terms of competition.
1Recent papers investigate the implication of competition on monetary policy transmission in indus-
trialized countries (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2013). Another intense debate in industrial organization
literature beyond banking concerns the relationship between competition and innovation. The question
is complex and results are inconclusive (Aghion et al., 2005; Zarutskie, 2013).
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2 Competition and banking efficiency
2.1 Testing the SCP hypothesis
Initial studies on the relationship between competition and efficiency originated from the
Structure-Conduct-Paradigm (SCP paradigm). The SCP paradigm (Mason, 1939; Bain,
1956) states that higher concentration in the market causes less competitive bank conduct
(higher interest rates, lower supply of funds) and hence higher profits. The first empirical
contributions regarding the industrial organization of the banking industry were devel-
oped to give empirical support for the SCP hypothesis in the U.S (Gilbert, 1984; Berger
and Hannan, 1989; Hannan, 1991; Gilbert and Zaretsky, 2003). These primary studies
often documented that banks outperform their counterparts in concentrated markets.
However, the positive correlation between profitability and market concentration can be
explained by reverse causation. According to the ”efficient structure” (ES) hypothesis
(Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977), better managed, more efficient firms can secure the
largest market shares, leading to higher concentration and more market power. Berger
(1995) attempted to distinguish between both explanations. He argued that after con-
trolling for bank efficiency, market share captures the relative market power of banks.2
His results did not provide support for the SCP hypothesis. Some works have used the
same methodology to test the SCP hypothesis in industrialized countries with mixed
conclusions (see: Gilbert and Zaretsky, 2003; Degryse et al., 2009).
Empirical tests of the SCP paradigm in the case of developing countries are scarce and
findings have been largely inconclusive. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) study the
relationship between profitability and the share of assets controlled by the three largest
banks in a sample of 80 countries, including both developed and developing countries.
Results give weak support for the SCP paradigm. Using a sample of 55 developing coun-
tries and the Lerner index as a proxy of market power, Amidu (2011) finds a positive
relationship between market power and profitability. As such, the author confirms the re-
lationship from conduct to performance but not from structure to performance. Flamini
et al. (2009) fail to provide support for the SCP hypothesis in the case of 41 African
2Concentration and market share were also regressed against the efficiency variables to test the nec-
essary condition of the ES hypotheses, namely that efficiency affects market structure.
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banking systems. Okeahalam (1998, 2002a,b) gives support for the SCP hypothesis in
a subset of Southern African economies. Chirwa (2003) reaches a similar conclusion in
Malawi, while evidence from Uganda, Nigeria, and Kenya does not support the SCP hy-
pothesis (cf. Table 1).
A fast-growing body of literature has investigated the determinants of margins or in-
terest spreads (Berger et al., 2004). Channeling funds from lenders to borrowers remains
the primary activity of banks, especially in developing areas. As a result, intermediation
costs is an alternative measure of bank performance more closely related to consumer
welfare losses and bank conduct. The findings regarding the role played by the structure
of the banking market on intermediation costs in cross-country studies are inconclusive
(cf. Table 2: Panel A).3 Crowley (2007) documents some stylized facts on the deter-
minants of margins in 18 English-speaking African countries. He highlights that bank
concentration is unrelated to the level of margins. In a more robust analysis, Ahokpossi
(2013) shows that bank concentration is negatively correlated to margins in Africa but
the coefficient turns positive when interaction with operating costs is included. In addi-
tion to these papers, some articles have analyzed the determinants of margins or spreads
in individual African countries. Results provide a mixed picture. Margins and spreads
appear positively correlated with the market concentration in Malawi and Ghana, but
not in Kenya. Results for the Ugandan banking system differ among studies (cf. Table
2: Panel C).
All of these studies suffer from one major shortcoming: concentration measures are
not good predictors of competition. The new empirical industrial organization literature
provides measures of competition based on firm behavior such as the Lerner index, the
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic or the Boone indicator (see Appendix A).4 Using the Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic to proxy competition, Gelos (2009) points out the absence of effect of
competition on interest margins in the case of 60 countries. Amidu and Wolfe (2012)
3Owing to the high spreads in Latin America, several works have focused their attention on this area
(Barajas et al., 2000; Brock and Rojas-Suarez, 2000; Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004, among others)
with mixed results regarding the implications of market power.
4For a complete review of each method, see Le´on (2014b).
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shed light on the positive relationship between the Lerner index and margins for 55 de-
veloping countries. Aboagye et al. (2008) adopt the same method in their investigation
of determinants of margins in Ghana and reach the same conclusion. Contrary to other
measures of competition, the Lerner index has the advantage of being firm-specific. This
is particularly useful when the level of analysis is at the bank level and not at the market
level. However, one might be concerned about the fact of regressing margins on mar-
gins.5 Indeed, the Lerner index is a price to (marginal) cost margin (Carbo´-Valverde
and Rodriguez Fernandez, 2007). Accountability margins (such as net interest margins
or spreads) and price-cost margins are strongly related, particularly in countries where
revenues diversification is limited. As a result, the positive coefficient is not only expected
but also misleading.6
To summarize neither study investigating the determinants of margins nor works test-
ing the SCP paradigm can reach a clear conclusion about the implications of competition
(and market power) on bank behavior. While some papers give support to the SCP view,
other works find the opposite results or an absence of impact. In addition, many pa-
pers suffer from certain limitations. Analyzing the determinants of margins (or profits)
require bank-level measures of market power to get precise estimations. However, the
natural candidate, namely the Lerner index, is subject to endogeneity problems. Indeed,
the Lerner index captures price-cost margin that is closely related to interest margin or
profits. Future works should provide innovative bank-level indicators of market power
that are not strongly correlated with margins to revisit the relationship between market
power and intermediation costs. In this way, Le´on (2015b) proposes an alternative indi-
cator of competition. His measure, called the local market power index, is based on the
concentration of banks in local markets (cities). His results tend to support the market
power view in the case of seven West African countries.
5Maudos and Ferna´ndez de Guevara (2004) and Maudos and Solis (2009) have used the same procedure
in the case of European countries and Mexico, respectively.
6The same argument may apply for studies regressing the Lerner index on profit, which can be
considered as a form of margin (Carbo´-Valverde et al., 2009a).
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2.2 Testing the Quiet Life hypothesis
The SCP paradigm asserts that banks in less competitive markets are more profitable
because borrowers pay higher loan rates and depositors receive lower deposit rates. In the
context of the literature that analyzes the relationship between competition and efficiency,
other papers have focused on the implication of competition on the internal organization
of banks.
The Quiet Life hypothesis documents that efficiency is lower in noncompetitive mar-
kets because of slack management (Hicks, 1935). Managers can relax their efforts in
less competitive markets. Market power, by blurring the signals, may allow managerial
incompetence or non-profit maximization behaviors not to be detected by the owners
(principal) and thus to persist. On the contrary, assessing the performance of the banks
relative to other banks is less complex in competitive markets. A small deviation from
profit maximization is more rapidly detected in competitive markets (for more details,
see Berger and Hannan, 1998).
There are alternative explanations advocating for the rejection of this hypothesis in
the specific case of the banking industry. Banks with market power can enjoy lower costs
of screening and monitoring borrowers (see below). In addition, market power allows
banks to benefit from greater profits, which may create incentives to behave prudently,
this behavior leading to the selection of less risky activities with lower monitoring costs.
Finally, banks with market power are under less pressure to increase the quality of bank-
ing services, which consequently decreases the operating costs.
In a widely cited paper, Berger and Hannan (1998) tested the Quiet Life hypothesis
using U.S. data from the 1980s. They found evidence that banks in more concentrated
markets exhibits poorer cost efficiency than other banks.7 However, some papers raise
doubts about the structural approach to proxy competition (see Appendix A). As a result,
this issue has been reinvestigated using the Lerner index as proxy of market power. Some
7Several works assess cost efficiency using accounting data such as overhead expenses to total assets
(Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the majority of studies compute (cost and
profit) efficiency score using frontier methods (stochastic frontier analysis or data envelopment analysis).
These methods have the major advantage of getting a more accurate measure of firm performance.
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papers have explored the relationship between market power and efficiency in banking
in developed countries, with mixed results. Findings from developing countries are also
ambiguous (Maudos and Solis, 2009; Turk Ariss, 2010; Williams, 2012; Funga´cˇova´ et al.,
2013).
The relationship between market power and efficiency might be specific in low-income
countries from Africa, and elsewhere, due to high degree of opacity and agency problems.
To my knowledge, however, a handful of paper has analyzed the impact of market power
on efficiency in Africa (and in the case of low-income countries from elsewhere). An initial
strand of works investigated the evolution of competition and efficiency over time (Hauner
and Peiris, 2008; Mwega, 2011) but did not analyze the direct relationship between market
power and efficiency. On the other hand, some studies on the determinants of efficiency in
Sub-Saharan Africa include a measure of bank concentration (Ndiaye, 2008; Kirkpatrick
et al., 2008; Kablan, 2010, 2009). Chen (2009) and Zhao and Murinde (2011) include
non-structural measures of competition in the determinants of bank efficiency in Africa.8
Both studies give support for the Quiet Life hypothesis but both studies suffer from two
drawbacks. On the one hand, they assume that the level of bank competition is exoge-
nous in contradiction to the efficient structure hypothesis. On the other hand, both works
employ market-based measures of competition and thus implicitly assume that all banks
have the same degree of market power. In line with the most recent studies, Le´on (2014a)
computed the Lerner index to test the Quiet Life hypothesis in a sample of 92 banks in
seven West African economies. The Lerner index has the advantage to be bank-specific
and he controls for endogeneity due to reverse causation. The results tend to reject the
Quiet Life hypothesis.
As a result, the literature examining the link between market power/competition and
efficiency is somewhat limited on Africa and findings do not provide a clear conclusion.
8Chen (2009) investigates the determinants of efficiency in a sample of 77 banks from 10 middle-
income countries (Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Rep. of Congo, Eq. Guinea, Gabon,
Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland). The level of competition is
assessed by the H-statistic. Zhao and Murinde (2011) analyze the determinants of bank efficiency in a
sample of 91 Nigerian banks and an elasticity-adjusted Lerner index (conjectural variation method) is
used to proxy competition.
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Indeed some works support the view that competition is beneficial for efficiency (Chen,
2009; Zhao and Murinde, 2011), while other papers find the opposite (Le´on, 2014a).
Future works should test the Quiet Life hypothesis in the context of opaque credit markets.
In addition, it should be instructive to test the channels whereby market power might
positively (or negatively) affect efficiency.
3 Competition and access to finance
Access to finance is another area in which the implication of competition is discussed. The
conventional view arguing that competition is always beneficial has been challenged since
the mid-1990s. The Information hypothesis posits that in the presence of information
asymmetries and agency costs, competition reduces access by making it more difficult
for banks to internalize the returns from investing in lending, in particular, with opaque
clients. Theory makes ambiguous predictions regarding the effect of competition on access
to finance.
3.1 Theoretical literature
3.1.1 Market power hypothesis
The conventional view suggests that market power is detrimental in banking as well as
in other industries. The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, as well as the Monti-
Klein model (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972), states that higher concentration in the market
increases interest rates and reduces the supply of funds. Besanko and Thakor (1992)
examine loan and deposit markets in a theoretical model where banks can differentiate
themselves from competitors. The model shows that equilibrium loan rates decline and
deposit interest rates increase after removing entry barriers, even when allowing for dif-
ferentiated competition. Guzman (2000) confirms the negative effect of market power in
a general equilibrium model of capital accumulation. He compares the effect of capital
accumulation of an economy that has a monopoly banking system versus one that has a
competitive system. He shows that a banking monopoly is more likely to result in credit
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rationing and leads to a lower capital accumulation rate.9
Barth et al. (2009) propose an indirect channel whereby competition may be beneficial
for access to finance. They note that corruption in lending undermines a bank’s function of
allocating scarce capital efficiently. In a simple bargaining model, they show that higher
concentration (less competition) in the banking sector is associated with more bank-
lending corruption. Extending the argument, decisions on funds allocation are more often
made on the basis of project return than on non-economic considerations (corruption,
personal ties or networks) in competitive credit markets. Finally, Hainz et al. (2008) point
out another channel whereby competition can alleviate credit constraints for small firms.
Banks can solve the resulting adverse selection problem either by screening or by asking
for collateral. The need for collateral in loan contracts is more likely when competition is
limited.10 Insofar as small enterprises have limited tangible assets, increasing competition
can improve the access to credit for these firms.
3.1.2 Information hypothesis
The Information hypothesis sheds light on one specificity of credit markets, namely the
informational asymmetry between lenders and borrowers.11 The asymmetries of informa-
tion induce the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard and therefore credit rationing
9Three different situations may occur in which monopoly power in banking is detrimental. First, a
monopoly banking system will ration credit under conditions where a competitive system would not. If
the conditions imply rationing in both systems, quantities are more rationed by a monopolistic bank
than within a competitive setting. Finally, without credit rationing, monopoly power is still inefficient
because a monopoly bank will charge a higher interest rate on loans (owing to excessive monitoring).
10The intuition is the following. Firms located close to a bank are financed through a screening
contract. Indeed, due to limited (physical and therefore informational) distance between the firm and
the bank, the bank can obtain a perfect signal on creditworthiness with a limited cost. As a result,
a contract based on screening is less costly for the firm. By contrast, for firms located away from the
bank, a collateralized contract is more profitable. When the number of banks increases, it becomes more
profitable for many firms that initially used a collateralized contract to adopt a screening contract. They
provide empirical evidence on 70 developing countries that supports their intuition.
11The Information hypothesis groups together heterogenous papers that draw special attention to
specificities of the banking industry, especially the importance of information. This strand of literature
is sometimes named differently in the literature.
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(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Since the 1990s, researchers have begun to examine how banks
might mitigate information problems in opaque firms lending. Lenders might get accurate
information on borrowers’ characteristics though ex-ante screening and/or ex-post mon-
itoring activities. The Information hypothesis argues that market power may alleviate
the information wedge between lenders and borrowers by impacting both screening and
monitoring activities.
Competition and relationship lending :
Petersen and Rajan (1995) acknowledge that banks will be less reluctant to finance riskier
ventures if competition is limited. They may accommodate an intertemporal smoothing
of contract terms, including losses for the bank in the short term that are recouped later in
the relationship. The bank relies on the fact that the successful firms will not be bid away
by rivals in the future. By contrast, in a competitive setting, a bank sustaining the initial
cost of offering credit at a lower rate can not retain its successful customers. Petersen
and Rajan (1995) underline that bank competition may be inimical to the formation of
relationships between firms and lenders. This idea was already advanced by Mayer (1988).
Relationship lending (or relationship banking) is one of the most powerful technologies
available to reduce information problems in opaque firm finance that have little credit
history or collateral (tangible assets).12 Alongside its effect on intertemporal smoothing
of contract terms, relationship lending is expected to relax financing constraints in several
other ways (for more details, see Boot, 2000; Eber, 2001).13 Strong relationships between
12According to Berger and Udell (2006), a lending technology can be defined as ”a combination of a
primary information source, screening and underwriting procedures, loan contract structure, and mon-
itoring mechanisms”. Lending technologies are often categorized into two types: transaction lending
(”arm’s length” lending) that is based on quantitative ”hard” information and relationship lending, which
is based on qualitative ”soft” information (Rajan, 1992; Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004). Relationship lend-
ing implies two elements: acquisition of confidential information (proprietary) and multiple interactions
with the same customer over time and/or across products (Boot, 2000).
13While the lending relationship is expected to alleviate financial constraints, this technology has less
clear-cut implications in terms of interest rates. Close ties between bank and firm reduce both verifica-
tion costs and risk-premiums and should thus decrease the interest rates charged by banks. However,
Sharpe (1990), Fisher (1990), and Rajan (1992) point out that lending banks possess ex post information
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firm and lender allow for monitoring the firms during the course of lending. Not only
is the lender willing to engage more resources in the acquisition of information, but
the borrower might also be more inclined to reveal strategic information exclusively to its
bank rather than to disseminate it to financial markets that would benefit its competitors
(Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995; Yosha, 1995). In addition, a privileged link between a
bank and a firm allows the firm to be partly protected from adverse business conditions
(Berlin and Mester, 1999). A third way whereby the lending relationship may relax
financing constraints is through better control of managers. Relationship lending might
reduce the moral hazard issue through the threat of termination (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1983; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990) and the reputation effect (Boot and Thakor, 1994).14
Therefore, the information hypothesis argues that competition can be detrimental to
credit availability through its negative impact on relationship lending.
A fast-growing body of theoretical literature has analyzed the relationship between
relationship lending and competition.15 The ”strategic theory of relationship lending”
challenges the information hypothesis. Private information may constrain competition in
the refinancing stage (Sharpe, 1990; Fisher, 1990; Rajan, 1992) and serve to constrain
entry into the industry (Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999; Dell’Ariccia, 2001; Marquez, 2002). Re-
lationship lending may be used strategically as a competitive device, when banks and the
products they offer are not homogenous. In this light, relationships emerge as a prime
source of an incumbent bank’s comparative advantage over de novo lenders. Boot and
monopoly. As a result, this information asymmetry allows banks to capture some of the rents generated
by their customers through higher interest rates. Switching is not a credible threat insofar as a borrower
can lose its reputation and be unable to obtain lower interest rates from outside banks. As a consequence,
theory cannot provide an unambiguous conclusion on the impact of relationship lending on rates.
14However, it should be noted that the threat of denial of additional loans is not a credible commitment.
Due to the soft-budget constraint problem, lending relationships might exert a perverse ex ante incentive
on firms’ behavior (Dewatrimont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).
15Berger and Udell (2006) argue that this characterization is flawed. There exist a number of distinct
transaction technologies used by banks, including financial statement lending, small business credit scor-
ing, asset-based lending, factoring, fixed-asset lending, and leasing. While financial statement lending is
well-fitted for transparent borrowers, other transaction technologies are all targeted to opaque borrowers.
De La Torre et al. (2010) show that banks offer a wide range of products and services on SMEs, through
the use of new technologies, business models and risk managements systems.
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Thakor (2000) argue that a more competitive environment may encourage banks to be-
come more client-driven and to customize services, thus focusing more on relationship
banking. Yafeh and Yosha (2001) suggest that facilitating entry (increased competition)
in the arm’s length market may strengthen bank-firm relationships. Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez (2004) find that greater competition from out-of-market banks generates an in-
crease in relationship lending by local banks. On the other hand, Dinc (2000) shows that
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the amount of relationship lending and
the number of banks. As a result, the theoretical literature on the effects of interbank
competition on bank orientation, and thus access to credit, is somewhat inconclusive.
Some studies empirically investigate the effect of competition on bank orientation with-
out solving the puzzle. Papers find evidence for negative effects (Petersen and Rajan,
1995; Fischer, 2000), positive effects (Kysucky and Norden, 2015) or U-shaped effects of
competition on relationship lending (Elsas, 2005; Degryse and Ongena, 2007; Presbitero
and Zazzaro, 2011). One should note that a similar argument can apply to studying the
incentives for banks to develop new products or open new branches in remote areas (see
Appendix B). A dominant position may allow the provider to reach scale economies. On
the other hand, competitive pressure may give a bank incentive to stand out from its
competitors.
Competition and screening activity :
The information hypothesis points out another possible shortcoming associated with bank
competition. Banks may actively produce ex-ante information by screening projects.
Banks use (imperfect) creditworthiness tests which allow them to discriminate between
worthy and unprofitable projects. Screening takes place in both arm’s length lending and
relationship lending. Contributions have investigated how competition affects the quality
of screening activities and banks’ incentives to invest in screening.
Increasing the number of banks in the credit market may blur the signal that banks
receive on firms’ quality (Broecker, 1990; Cao and Shi, 2001). Rejected applicants (either
of high or low quality) can continue to apply to other banks; the more banks there are in
the market, the more chances the worst applicants have of being mistaken for a good risk.
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Increasing the number of banks performing screening tests decreases the average credit-
worthiness of firms, and increases the probability that a bank will not grant a loan. This
phenomenon is known as the ”winner’s curse” problem. Marquez (2002) shows that with
more competing banks, each bank becomes informed about a smaller pool of borrowers,
resulting in less efficient borrower screening. As a result, due to less efficient screening,
banks become more conservative and the efficiency of allocation decreases, while interest
rates increase when competition is fiercer.
Competition plays a role not only on the quality of screening, but also on banks’
incentives to invest in screening technologies. Previous contributions assume that credit-
worthiness tests are imperfect filters between worthy and unprofitable projects but their
precision can be adjusted by the investment of resources. Gehrig (1998) investigates the
incentives of banks to produce information by allowing them to choose the level of their
screening effort. Banks like to invest in costly screening activities for two reasons. More
precise screening reduces credit risk and therefore the cost of lending and increases the
approval of profitable projects since less of them are erroneously rejected. Competition
exerts an ambiguous impact on investment in screening. A compression of lending margins
reduces screening incentives if, and only if, the value of identifying good projects exceeds
that of rejecting bad ones. In other words, in economies where banks are mainly con-
cerned with avoiding bad projects, harsher competition may improve screening incentives.
According to Gehrig (1998), this scenario is particularly relevant for developing countries.
In a different setting, Dell’Ariccia (2000) also documents an ambiguous relationship be-
tween market structure and screening incentives. The net effect varies depending on
which of the following two opposite effects prevails. On the one hand, fiercer competition
aggravates the adverse selection problem that banks face, causing them to invest more in
screening. On the other hand, more competition corresponds to a stronger temptation
to deviate from a screening equilibrium and consequently increases the incentive to stop
screening applicant borrowers.
None of these models take into account the fact that acquisition of information may
be a strategic tool. Banks can use proprietary information in order to soften lending
competition from outside banks. Uninformed banks cannot really compete with a lender
that possesses private information. Hauswald and Marquez (2006) take into account the
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strategic role of information acquisition. They point out that increased competition re-
duces intermediaries’ rents and decreases their overall incentives to generate information.
This result is in line with previous models that study the relationship between competition
and screening incentives (Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr, 1999; Manove et al., 2001).
3.2 Empirical literature
Theoretical literature is somewhat inconclusive regarding the impact of competition on
access to finance. One might expect that the empirical literature would provide some
insights on this debate. The empirical literature regarding the consequences of bank
competition on credit availability has made some progress over the past decade. Con-
trary to literature on the consequences of bank competition on efficiency, identifying
credit constraints and thus studying the implications of competition on credit availabil-
ity requires having information on non-financial firms (see Appendix C). Unfortunately,
firm-level data on Africa is often too scarce to provide robust econometric works. As a
result, no study has directly investigated this question on Africa. In this section, I thus
review the studies on developing countries as well as indirect evidence from Africa.
3.2.1 Competition and dynamics of real sectors
In line with the debate on the impact of bank competition on credit availability, some
papers have studied the role of competition on the dynamics of non-financial industries
(entry and life duration of new firms, growth or structure of non-financial industries).
Studies including developing countries provide mixed results regarding the impact of
competition on real activity (see Table 3).16
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) (CG) extend the model of Rajan and Zingales (1998)
by introducing bank market concentration as an explanatory variable of growth for 36
16Evidence of effects of interbank competition on real activity in developed countries is also mixed.
Some papers support the market power view (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Black and Strahan, 2002;
Cetorelli, 2004; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Bertrand et al., 2007), while others give support for the infor-
mation hypothesis (Jackson and Thomas, 1995; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2003; Ferna´ndez de
Guevara and Maudos, 2009).
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industries in 41 countries.17 The findings suggest a non-trivial impact of bank concen-
tration on industrial growth. Banking sector concentration exerts a depressing effect on
overall economic growth even as it promotes the growth of industries that depend heavily
on external finance. Deidda and Fattouh (2005) use the same methodology and data but
divide the sample into two groups of countries: low-income and high-income countries.
They find that banking concentration is negatively associated with industrial growth only
in the sub-sample of low-income countries. There is no significant relationship between
banking concentration and growth in high-income countries. Ferna´ndez et al. (2010),
however, find opposite results. They analyze the effect of bank concentration on eco-
nomic growth for 84 countries. Results indicate that bank concentration has a negative
effect on economic growth, an effect that disappears in countries with poorer quality
institutional environments.18
Given the limitations of the concentration measures to proxy competition (see Ap-
pendix A), some papers have assessed the level of competition by non-structural measures.
In spite of the use of the same methodology (the CG’s method), these papers do not pro-
vide the same conclusions (see Table 3). While some articles give support for the market
power hypothesis (Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Liu and Mirzaei, 2013), other papers are
in line with the information hypothesis (Ferna´ndez de Guevara and Maudos, 2011; Hoxha,
2013).
3.2.2 Competition and credit availability
Since the mid-2000s, in the footsteps of Petersen and Rajan (1995), some works have
scrutinized the direct effects of competition on the availability of bank credit to firms
17Rajan and Zingales (1998) assume that industries that are more dependent on external financing will
have relatively higher growth rates in countries that have more developed financial markets. To test this
hypothesis, they regress an index of external financial dependence of industry j interacted with financial
development on growth of value added in sector j. The industry’s dependence on external finance is
extracted from U.S. data (the U.S. market is assumed to be the market in which financial constraints
are the lowest).
18This finding is in line with the theoretical framework developed by Cetorelli and Peretto (2012)
which states that in economies where market uncertainty is high, less competition leads to higher capital
accumulation.
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in developing economies and have found mixed results.19 Using data on 74 countries,
Beck et al. (2004) show that bank concentration increases the probability that a firm
perceives finance as a major obstacle to its growth. Clarke et al. (2006) suggest that
foreign bank penetration (increasing competition) reduces the perception of finance as an
obstacle in 38 emerging countries, confirming the market power view. Measures extracted
from firms’ perception are open to criticism (see Appendix C). Other research assesses the
need for external funds by using a mix of external and internal funds or the sensitivity of
investment on cash-flow. Gonza´lez and Gonza´lez (2008) give support for the Information
hypothesis view, while the results from Lin et al. (2010) are in line with the Market Power
hypothesis.
Carbo´-Valverde et al. (2009b) document that the results are sensitive to the choice
between structural and non-structural measures of competition. Exploiting a dataset on
SMEs in Spain, the authors find evidence that competition (a lower Lerner value) pro-
motes access to finance, despite the fact that firms face fewer constraints in concentrated
markets. Using data for 33 countries, Mudd (2013) points out that the relationship be-
tween competition and access to credit is more complex. He documents that competition
(assessed by Panzar-Rosse H-value) has a positive but declining effect on firm use of bank
loans which turns to a negative impact for competitive markets above the mean. Using
a sample of 53 developing countries, Love and Martinez Peria (2015) give support for
the market power hypothesis. They find that the probability of a firm having a line of
credit is reduced in countries where market power is higher (measured by Lerner index
and Boone indicator). Le´on (2015a) reach similar conclusion using a different measure
of credit availability, a large sample of countries, and different measures of competition.
19The empirical evidence related to the effect of bank competition on small firm credit availability is
mixed in industrialized countries. Some cases find concentration associated with improved small firm
credit availability (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Fischer, 2000) or to have no effect (Jayaratne and Wolken,
1999; Berger, 2007). Zarutskie (2006) documents that newly formed firms have significantly less outside
debt on their balance sheets following deregulation. Rice and Strahan (2010) find that in states more
open to branching, small firms are more likely to borrow and do so at lower rates. However, the authors
find that there no effects on the amount that small firms can borrow. Scott and Dunkelberg (2010) shows
a significant positive association between changes in bank competition reported by small firms and their
reports of changes in quality of services provided by banks.
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He considers the consequences of bank competition on credit constraints using firm level
data covering 69 developing countries. Firms are classified as financially constrained if
their loan application was rejected or if they refused to apply due to market frictions
(see Appendix C). Competition is assessed by computing three non-structural measures
(Boone indicator, Lerner index and H-statistic). The results show that financing con-
straints are alleviated in countries where banking markets are more competitive. The
empirical set-up allows us not only to test the information hypothesis against the market
power hypothesis but also to investigate the channels by which competition affects credit
availability. The results show that competition not only leads to less severe loan approval
decisions but that it also reduces borrower discouragement.
3.2.3 Indirect evidence in the case of Africa
Only a handful of papers have given special attention to Africa. Kpodar (2005) gives
support for the market power view. He documents that the weak relationship between
finance and growth in Africa is partially due to concentration in the banking industries.
Two other studies investigate the consequences of financial liberalization in Africa and
are more consistent with the Information hypothesis. O’Toole (2012) documents that
financial liberalization does not alleviate financing constraints in Africa. Kabango and
Paloni (2011) find that financial liberalization in Malawi resulted in an increase in indus-
trial concentration and a decrease of net firm entry, especially in sectors that are more
dependent to finance. However, concentration and liberalization are different than com-
petition. Liberalization policies do not necessarily increase competition (Delis, 2012) and
banks may behave competitively in concentrated markets (Baumol et al., 1982). In ad-
dition, these studies do not directly investigate the impact on access to credit but rather
analyze the implications of competition on real sector activity.
To summarize, while the relationship between bank competition and credit availability
has been largely investigated in industrialized countries, few papers study it in the case of
African countries. Recent papers give support for the market power hypothesis (Love and
Martinez Peria, 2015; Le´on, 2015b). Unfortunately the existing researches often exclude
many low-income countries, especially from Africa, due to the lack of data. Some indirect
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evidence has been provided in the case of African economies but conclusions are mixed.
Future research should specifically study the implications of competition on credit access
in low-income countries from Africa and elsewhere.
4 Competition and financial stability
There is a hot debate in the banking literature regarding the effect of competition on
overall financial stability. Interest on this subject intensified during the recent global
financial crisis, as many questioned whether high competition in developed and emerging
countries was partly to blame. Theoretical and empirical studies have not come to a
conclusive finding on the relationship between competition and stability. The competition-
fragility view posits that more competition among banks leads to more fragility, while
the proponents of the competition-stability view argue that instability is more likely in
less competitive markets.
4.1 Theoretical literature
4.1.1 Competition-fragility view
Under the competition-fragility view, restrained competition should encourage banks to
protect their higher franchise values by pursuing safer policies that contribute to the
stability of the entire banking system (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Hellmann et al., 2000,
among others).20 A bank with more market power enjoys higher profits and has more to
lose if it takes on more risk. Cordella and Yeyati (2002) show that increased competition
reduces differentiation and margins. This may not only provide an incentive to take more
risk (Charter Value hypothesis) but may also render banks more vulnerable to shocks.
Higher profits allow banks to maintain higher levels of capital (”buffer”) that protect them
from external shocks and diversification is a way to cope with idiosyncratic risk. Another
channel through which competition can impact stability is its detrimental effect on the
incentives and effectiveness of screening activity (Broecker, 1990; Hauswald and Marquez,
20For in-depth discussions about the theoretical linkages between competition and stability in banking,
see Allen and Gale (2004) and Carletti (2008).
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2006). This aggravates the information problem that banks face, thus increasing the risk
of defaults. Competition can also destabilize the banking sector through its impact on
the interbank market and the payments system. Allen and Gale (2000) show that banks
do not have incentives to provide liquidity to a troubled bank when the interbank market
is competitive, because each of them acts as price taker and assumes that its action does
not affect the equilibrium.
4.1.2 Competition-stability view
The proponents of the competition-stability view argue that less competition is detrimen-
tal for financial stability. A common assumption of the models based on the charter value
is that banks have complete control over the risk of their portfolios. Existing theory ig-
nores the potential impact of market power on borrowers’ behavior. Boyd and De Nicolo
(2005) investigate the implications of competition on loan markets and borrowers’ behav-
ior. Greater competition in the loan market reduces the interest rates that entrepreneurs
pay. These lower interest rates may induce firms to assume lower risk due to higher prof-
its, which results in a lower probability that loans turn non-performing. Martinez-Miera
and Repullo (2010) extend the Boyd and De Nicolo’s (BDN) model. As in the BDN
model, the ”risk shifting” effect captures the result that more competition leads to lower
loan rates, lower firm default probabilities and improved bank stability. However, lower
rates also reduce interest payments and thus overall bank revenues, which can lead to
potentially greater bank risk and bank failures. This effect is defined as the ”margin”
effect. A U-shaped relationship between the number of banks and the risk of bank failure
is found to represent the net effect of these two forces. The ”risk-shifting” effect is shown
to dominate in very concentrated markets, such that increased entry improves bank risk
measures. In already competitive markets, the margin effect dominates such that further
entry worsens bank risk.21 Other arguments focus on indirect effects of bank competition.
Banks in less competitive environments are often more likely to be inefficiently managed
21Caminal and Matutes (2002) propose another model based on the entrepreneurial moral hazard
problem. They consider that banks have two ways to deal with moral hazard: monitoring and rationing.
They show that less competition can lead to less credit rationing (more monitoring), larger loans and
higher probability of failure.
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and more likely to fail (Schaeck and Ciha´k, 2013).22 Furthermore, Allen et al. (2011)
show that competition may motivate banks to hold higher levels of capital because this
indicates a commitment to monitoring and attracts creditworthy borrowers.23
4.2 Empirical literature
Numerous empirical papers have used different samples, risk measures and competi-
tion proxies to discriminate between the competition-fragility and competition-stability
views.24
4.2.1 Competition and financial system stability
The first strand of studies analyzes the impact of bank competition on financial stability.
Bank stability is often measured by systemic banking distress, defined as periods where
the banking system is not capable of fulfilling its functions. Papers often use the occur-
rence of a banking crisis to define such events (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997;
Laeven and Valencia, 2012). The majority of works are in line with the competition-
stability view. One exception is the work of Beck et al. (2006). They investigate the
impact of bank concentration on the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis on a sample
of 69 countries. They show that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated
banking systems. Considering 91 countries, however, Boyd et al. (2010) document that
22The same argument may apply in concentrated markets if larger banks are more likely to receive
public guarantees (Mishkin, 1999).
23Closely linked to the market structure and fragility debate is the issue of bank size. Larger banks
can better diversify their portfolios. Furthermore larger banks may be easier to supervise. Hence,
supervision of banks may be more effective and the risk of a system-wide contagion should presumably
recede (Allen and Gale, 2000). Financial fragility is therefore reduced in more concentrated markets.
Advocates of the competition-stability view disagree with the notion that concentrated banking systems
are more stable. More concentrated markets with larger banks can be more complex and hence harder to
supervise. Furthermore, larger banks can take more risks because the ”too big to fail” principle protects
them against failure.
24Only a handful of cross-sectional studies regarding the competition-stability nexus are presented.
Readers may refer to Beck (2008) or Jime´nez et al. (2013) for additional references on country specific
studies.
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sharp decreases in loan growth are more likely to occur in less diluted markets.25 Schaeck
et al. (2009) investigate the relationship between occurrence and duration of financial
crises and competition for 45 countries. Competition is assessed by the Panzar-Rosse
H-statistic. The authors document that crises are more likely to occur and for longer pe-
riods in less competitive banking markets, in line with the competition-stability view. In
a recent paper, Anginer et al. (2012) introduce a new measure of systemic risk. Systemic
risk is measured as the codependence in default probability across banks. They find that
lower market power (as measured by the Lerner index) encourages banks to diversify risk
rendering the banking system less fragile to shocks. They also show that lack of compe-
tition has a more adverse effect in countries with low levels of foreign ownership, weak
investor protection, generous safety nets and weak regulation and supervision.
4.2.2 Competition and individual bank soundness
Rather than focusing on systemic bank distress, numerous studies use bank-level data to
calculate individual bank soundness. The most widely used proxy is the Z-score, which
is the sum of capital-asset ratio and return on assets, weighted by the standard deviation
of return on assets. The Z-score measures the distance from insolvency and a higher
Z-score implies a lower probability of insolvency (Roy, 1952). Alternatively, researchers
have used the non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio. This proxy captures the risk of default
related to the loan portfolio.
There is no academic consensus on whether bank competition leads to more or less
financial soundness. Some studies support the competition-fragility view, while others
find positive links between competition and bank stability (see Table 4). These studies
differ in their samples and in the measures of competition employed. Channels whereby
competition impacts bank soundness remain imperfectly known. Recent works have in-
vestigated this question. Berger et al. (2009), using data for banks in 23 industrialized
countries, show that more market power (measured by the Lerner index) results in a
higher share of non-performing loans but reduces the risk of insolvency (Z-score). The
authors argue that these findings are not in opposition. Even if market power in the
25Boyd et al. (2010) find that the likelihood of crisis, measured by government interventions, is unaf-
fected by the market concentration, in line with Beck et al. (2006).
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loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risk of banks need not increase
if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in
other risk-mitigating techniques. This hypothesis is confirmed by Schaeck and Ciha´k
(2012). They show that banks hold higher capital ratios in more competitive environ-
ments in the context of European banking. Amidu and Wolfe (2013) reach a similar
conclusion in the case of developing and emerging countries. Schaeck and Ciha´k (2013)
suggest that efficiency is the conduit through which competition contributes to stability,
while Delis and Kouretas (2011) present strong empirical evidence that low-interest rates
indeed substantially increase bank risk-taking in the Euro zone.
The context in which banks operate can impact the competition-stability nexus. Beck
et al. (2013) document that even if the average relationship between competition and bank
soundness is in line with the competition-fragility view, there is a large variation both over
time and across countries. There are several countries for which the competition-stability
view is validated. Agoraki et al. (2011) and Beck et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence
that the relationship between competition and stability varies across markets with dif-
ferent regulatory frameworks, market structures and levels of institutional development.
For instance, Beck et al. (2013) document that competition may be particularly harmful
in countries where banks have less incentives to invest in information acquisition (more
effective systems of credit information sharing), where alternative sources of finance for
transparent firms exist (stock markets are more liquid), where higher risk of moral haz-
ard is likely (deposit insurance schemes are more generous) and where financial activity
is more restricted.
Insofar as the environment plays a role in determining the competition-stability nexus,
it should be instructive to investigate the specificities of African economies. African
banks face specific challenges that render the competition-stability nexus specific. To my
knowledge, only Moyo et al. (2014) has investigated the relationship between stability and
competition in Africa. Using information on more than 600 banks in 16 SSA countries
over the period 1995-2010, they document that banks are more stable in countries with
competitive banking systems (higher level of H-statistic). This study tends to show that
competition enhances financial stability in Africa. Future research should be welcomed to
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confirm or infirm their results. In particular, future works could investigate the channels
by which competition affects stability in Africa and elsewhere (regulation, institutional
development, etc.). In addition, studies employing bank-level data and the Lerner index
should keep in mind that price-cost margins are influenced by a bank’s risk-taking be-
havior (Oliver et al., 2006). Developing a risk-adjusted Lerner index to investigate the
market power-stability nexus is therefore crucial.
5 Conclusion
Recent trends in financial systems in Africa raise questions about the implications of
competition among banks. The literature has identified at least three reasons why com-
petition in the financial sector is important: banking efficiency, access to finance, and
stability. The literature that focuses on African banking systems is scarce and largely
inconclusive.
Some papers have scrutinized the relationship between competition (or market power)
and efficiency in African economies. These works have tested the SCP hypothesis or
studied the relationship between market structure and margins. However, these articles
focus on a handful of African countries and findings are inconclusive. In addition, many
papers suffer from major drawbacks that render the results questionable. Furthermore,
only an handful of papers have tested the Quiet Life hypothesis in Africa.
The implications of bank competition on credit availability have rarely been investi-
gated in the case of less mature banking systems. Some works have directly or indirectly
studied the relationship between bank competition and access to credit for developing
countries. Unfortunately, African countries (or low-income countries) are rarely included
in the samples. Further works should study directly this question using microdata or
country’s experience or natural experiment.
Finally, only one paper has investigated the competition - stability nexus in Africa,
providing support for the competition-stability view. Future works (on Africa but also
on other countries) special attention should be dedicated to the channels by which bank
competition impacts stability.
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Table 1: The Structure-Performance hypothesis testing
Author(s) Samplea Period Measures of Control for Consistent with
Profitabilityb Market structurec ES hypothesis?d SCP hypothesis?
Panel A: Cross-country studies
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 80 countries (5) 1988-1995 PBT/TA CR3 Yes (Overhead) Yes (No robust)
Flamini et al. (2009) 41 countries (41) 1998-2006 RoA MS Yes (Op. cost) No
Amidu (2011) 55 countries (22) 2000-2007 RoA Lerner Yes (Op. cost) Yes
Panel B: Single African studies
Nannyonjo (2001) Uganda 1993-1999 RoA HHI and MS Yes (Cost Eff.) No
Mugume (2008) Uganda 1995-2005 RoA HHI and MS Yes (Cost Eff.) Yes
Chirwa (2003) Malawi 1970-1994 RoA and RoE CR3 and MS No Yes
Aburime (2008) Nigeria 1980-2007 RoA and PBT/TA CR3 No No
Olweny and Shipho (2011) Kenya 2002-2008 PBT/TA HHI Yes (Op. cost) No
Okeahalam (1998)e Botswana 1996-1998 Six interest rates CR3 and HHI No Yes
Okeahalam (2002a)e South Africa 1997-1999 Six interest rates CR3 and HHI No Yes
Okeahalam (2002b)e South Africa, Namibia, 1997-1999 Six interest rates CR3 and HHI No Yes
Lesotho, and Swaziland
a The number of African economies (when available) is reported in parentheses
b RoA: Return on Assets ; RoE: Return on Equity ; PBT/TA: Profit before tax to total assets
c MS: Market share ; CR3 : Fraction of assets controlled by the 3 largest banks ; HHI : Herfindhal-Hirschman Index
d Op. Cost: Operating costs; Cost Eff.: Cost efficiency score extracted from frontier analysis
e Methodology proposed by Berger and Hannan (1989) is employed
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Table 2: Determinants of margins and spreads
Author(s) Samplea Period Measures of Consistent with
Int. costsb Competitionc SCP hypothesis?
Panel A: Cross-country studies
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 80 countries (5) 1988-1995 NIM CR3 Yes
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2004) 72 countries 1995-1999 NIM CR3 Yes (No robust)
Detragiache et al. (2005) 84 countries (31) 1999-2001 NIM CR5 No (opposite sign)
Laeven and Majnoni (2005) 106 countries (12) 2000 IRS CR5 No
Beck and Hesse (2009) 86 countries 2000-2004 NIM CR3 No (opposite sign)
Dietrich et al. (2010) 96 countries 1994-2008 NIM CR3 No
Gelos (2009) From 30 to 60 countries 1999-2002 NIM H-statistic and CR5 No
Amidu and Wolfe (2012) 55 countries (22) 2000-2007 NIM Lerner Yes (No robust)
Panel B: Cross-country African studies
Crowley (2007) 18 African countries 1975-2004 NIM and IRS CR3 and HHI No
Ahokpossi (2013) 41 African countries 1995-2008 NIM HHI Ambiguous
Le´on (2015b) 7 African countries 2004-2009 NIM and IRS LMPI Yes
Panel C: Single African studies
Nannyonjo (2001) Uganda (17 banks) 1994-1998 NIM and IRS CR3 NIM: No / IRS:Yes
Mugume (2008) Uganda (14 banks) 1995-2007 IRS HHI No (opposite sign)
Beck and Hesse (2009) Uganda (16 banks) 1999-2005 NIM and IRS HHI No
Chirwa and Mlachila (2004) Malawi (5 banks) 1989-1999 IRS HHI Yes
Bawumia et al. (2005) Ghana (16 banks) 2000-2004 NIM MS Yes
Aboagye et al. (2008) Ghana (17 banks) 2001-2006 NIM HHI and Lerner Yes
Hesse (2007) Kenya 2000-2005 IRS HHI No (opposite sign)
Beck et al. (2010) Kenya (45 banks) 2000-2007 IRS HHI No
a The number of African economies (when available) is reported in parentheses
b Intermediation costs: NIM: Net Interest Margins ; IRS:Interest Rates Spreads
c CRx : Fraction of assets controlled by the x largest banks ; HHI : Herfindhal-Hirscman Index; LMPI: Local market power index
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Table 3: Bank competition and real economic activity
Author(s) Samplea Period Methodb Measures of Consistent with
Ind. Count. Competitionc Market power view?
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) 36 41 1980-1990 C&G CR3 and CR5 No
Deidda and Fattouh (2005) 36 41 1980-1991 C&G CR3 Yes for LIC; No for HICd
Ferna´ndez et al. (2010) - 84 1980-2004 Growth equation CR3 Yes (non-linear)
Claessens and Laeven (2005) 36 16 1980-1990 C&G H-stat Yes
Liu and Mirzaei (2013) 23 48 2001-2010 C&G Boone indicator Yes
Ferna´ndez de Guevara and Maudos (2011) 53 21 1993-2003 C&G Lerner and H-stat No
Hoxha (2013) 36 37 1994-2006 C&G H-stat No
a Ind: number of industries or sectors; Count: Number of countries
b C&G refers to the method proposed by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001)
c CRx : Fraction of assets controlled by the x largest banks
d LIC: low-income countries; HIC: high-income countries
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Table 4: Bank stability and competition
Author(s) Sample Period Measure(s) of
(# of African countries) Stabilitya Competitionb
Papers in line with competition-stability view
Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) 25 European countries 1997-2005 Z-score CR3, CR5 and HHI
Boyd et al. (2009) 134 countries 1993-2004 Z-score HHI
Schaeck and Ciha´k (2013) 10 European countries 1995-2005 Z-score Boone indicator
Amidu and Wolfe (2013) 55 Developing countries (22) 2000-2007 Z-score, NPLs and Cap. Ratio Lerner and H-statistic
Schaeck and Ciha´k (2012) 10 European countries 1995-2005 Cap. Ratio H-statistic
Papers in line with competition-fragility view
Yeyati and Micco (2007) 8 Latin American countries 1993-2002 Z-score H-statistic
Turk Ariss (2010) 60 Developing countries (14) 1999-2005 Z-score Lerner
Beck et al. (2013) 79 countries 1994-2009 Z-score Lerner
Agoraki et al. (2011) 13 CEE countries 1998-2005 NPLs Lerner
Fu et al. (2014) 14 Asian countries 2003-2010 Market distance to default Lerner
Papers with ambiguous or non-linear results
Berger et al. (2009) 23 industrialized countries 1999-2005 Z-score and NPLs Lerner
Tabak et al. (2012) 10 Latin American countries 2003-2008 Z-score (SFA) Boone indicator
a NPLs: Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans; Cap. Ratio: Ratio of Equity to total assets; SFA: Stochastic frontier analysis
b CRx : Fraction of assets controlled by the x largest banks ; HHI : Herfindhal-Hirscman Index
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Appendix A Measuring bank competition
According to the SCP paradigm, market structure (i.e. concentration) is expected to
influence the conduct of banks. As a result, initial studies on the industrial organization
of the banking industry employed proxies of the market structure to assess the degree
of competition (number of banks, share of assets held by the five largest banks, HHI).
Several contributions have, however, cast doubt on the consistency and robustness of
the structural approach as an indicator of competition in banking. For instance, both
the theory of contestability (Baumol et al., 1983) and the theory of efficient-structure
(Demsetz, 1973) argue that market structure is a weak proxy of competition.
Shortcomings in the structural approach have led to a number of attempts to collect
empirical evidence on the nature of competition by observing conduct directly. The three
most frequently non-structural measures of competition are the Lerner index, the Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic and the Boone indicator.
The Lerner index is a measure of individual market power. The market power of a firm
is identified by the divergence between the firm’s price and its marginal costs (relative
to price). Greater values of the Lerner index are associated with greater levels of market
power.
Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed another measure of competition based on the
transmission of input prices on firms’ revenues. From the standard theory, they showed
that the transmission of input price variation differs according to the degree of competi-
tion in the market (under certain assumptions). The degree of competition is therefore
obtained by regressing the input prices on firms’ revenues. Weak transmissions of in-
put prices to bank’s revenues are interpreted to indicate the exercise of market power in
pricing. Higher values indicate more competition.
Boone (2008) has recently proposed a new indicator. The basic intuition underlying
this indicator is that more efficient firms achieve superior performance in the sense of
higher profit or higher market shares, and that this effect is stronger the heavier the
competition is. The value of the Boone indicator is therefore obtained by regressing
profits on marginal costs (in logarithm).
The interested reader may refer to Le´on (2014b) for more details.
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Appendix B Can bank competition help to reach the
poor? Some thoughts
While bank competition has certainly more impact on the missing middle, it can also
help or hinder the financial inclusion of the poorer population. The conventional view
argues that enhancing competition among banks can reduce costs of financial services and
therefore can improve the access and the use of financial services. Beck et al. (2008) find
support to this view. However, bank competition might be detrimental for financial in-
clusion. Financial inclusion of the poorer population is mainly driven by the microfinance
institutions (MFIs) in Africa. Greater competition in the banking industry might affect
the performance of the MFIs and therefore their ability to reach the poor. A thinning in
margins in the traditional sector because of intensified competition between banks may
push them to develop new products dedicated to microenterprises (De La Torre et al.,
2010). The entry of new actors can reduce the profits of MFIs, in particular if banks
are able to finance the largest (and certainly most profitable) borrowers. In addition, the
entry of new providers of microfinance can impact the repayment rates which should have
a negative impact on profits (McIntosh et al., 2005). By contrast, the entry of banks is
associated with MFIs pushing toward poorer markets (Cull et al., 2013).
Another channel whereby competition among banks might affect the financial inclusion is
through the adoption of new technologies, in particular the mobile-banking (m-banking).
The rapid growth of mobile phone usage has potential impacts on economic performances
in Africa (Aker and Mbiti, 2010). Mobile phone technology can serve as a ”silver bullet”
for financial inclusion in remote areas through the development of the mobile banking
and especially the mobile money transfer (Beck and Cull, 2013). The adoption of new
technologies such as m-payment can be more easily in less competitive markets, which al-
low the provider to reach scale economies rapidly. Indeed the success of M-Pesa in Kenya
has often been associated with the dominant market position of Safaricom. However, in
parallel with the literature on relationship lending (Boot and Thakor, 2000), innovations
may be used strategically to soften competition from other banks. The first mover may
benefit from the network externalities and therefore block the entry of new suppliers in
the industry. As a result, the linkages between m-banking and competition are relatively.
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Appendix C Measuring credit constraints in devel-
oping countries
The traditional methodology for identifying credit constraints originates in the Modigliani-
Miller theorem (MMT). Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that in frictionless markets,
the investment behavior of a firm is irrelevant to its financing decisions and internal and
external funds are perfect substitutes. With market imperfections, however, the level of
investment is positively related to available internal funds. Empirically higher sensitivity
of investment to internal funds suggests the presence of financing constraints. The main
problem with this approach stems from the possibility that cash flow may be correlated
with investment for other reasons (e.g. current cash flow is a good predictor of future prof-
itability). Possible solutions are to include the Tobin Q-ratio in the estimated equation
(Tobin, 1969; Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) or to estimate the neoclas-
sical investment Euler equation for capital stock. The Euler equation approach is more
relevant for developing countries because it does not require information on stock market
values. However, some studies point out that cash flow is an important determinant of
investment even in the absence of financial frictions (Gomes, 2001; Alti, 2003).
Alternative empirical methodologies in identifying financing constraints also invoke
the MMT but use a simple proxy of the mix between internal and external funds. The
ratio of debt to total assets (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Carbo´-Valverde et al.,
2009b) or the trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999)
are often employed to proxy credit constraints. However, in addition to the theoretical
underpinnings, a major shortcoming is the relative scarcity of firm-level financial figures
for SMEs in developing and emerging countries.26
Recently, the availability of firm survey data containing questions on access to formal
finance has facilitated the estimation of direct measures of credit constraints for firms.
Researchers use this information in two ways. Studies use survey data on managers’ per-
ception of finance as an obstacle to growth and development (Beck et al., 2004; Beck and
26
Identifying supply-side constraints by using the debt ratio is complex insofar as changes in debt ratio can be due to changes in demand
for credit (Carbo´-Valverde et al., 2009b). Moreover, studies employing trade credit assume that trade credit is one of the most expensive
forms of external finance, a view challenged by recent works (Giannetti et al., 2011).
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Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Clarke et al., 2006). The survey design and measure employed are
open to criticism due to perception bias or inability to quantify the severity of obstacles
reported (Ergungor, 2004). Researchers often use these surveys to go in another direc-
tion and investigate the credit market experience of firms. Credit constraints are thus
measured by the likelihood to obtain a loan or line of credit (Love and Martinez Peria,
2015; Mudd, 2013). However, the fact that a firm does not have credit is not sufficient
to prove constraints, since this firm may not have a demand for credit, which is possi-
ble even in less developed financial markets (Bigsten et al., 2003; Cole, 2010). Hence,
recent works on developing and emerging countries have tried to distinguish between
constrained borrowers and other firms without a loan (Brown et al., 2011; Popov and
Udell, 2012; Chong et al., 2013; Le´on, 2015a). The principle is to identify only firms who
are constrained due to failures/imperfections in capital markets. This measure is closer
to a possible definition of credit constraints as a situation wherein a firm with a viable
project cannot obtain external funds due to financial market imperfections (whereas this
firm would obtain external funds in market without frictions).
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